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This paper presents a model depicting cross-border payment systems as a mixed 
oligopoly. A private net settlement system that maximises profit competes with 
the central banks’ gross settlement system that maximises welfare. It may be 
optimal for the central bank system to encourage increased use of the private 
system by charging fees that exceed the marginal cost. The central bank system is 
not only a competitor but also an essential service provider, because central bank 
money is needed for net settlement of payments in the private system. In some 
cases the central bank system can paradoxically induce the private system to 
charge lower fees by making it expensive to use central bank money for 
settlement purposes. 
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Tutkimuksessa esitetään malli, joka kuvaa maidenvälisiä maksujärjestelmiä seka-
oligopolina. Yksityinen voittoa maksimoiva nettoselvitykseen perustuva järjestel-
mä kilpailee keskuspankkien hyvinvointia maksimoivan bruttoselvitysjärjestel-
män kanssa. Keskuspankkijärjestelmän voi olla optimaalista lisätä yksityisen 
järjestelmän käyttöä perimällä rajakustannuksia korkeampia hintoja. Keskuspank-
kijärjestelmä on paitsi kilpailija myös tärkeä palveluntuottaja, sillä keskus-
pankkirahaa tarvitaan maksujen nettoselvitykseen yksityisessä järjestelmässä. 
Perimällä korkeita maksuja keskuspankkirahan käytöstä selvitystarkoituksiin 
keskuspankkijärjestelmä voi joissain tapauksissa paradoksaalisesti saada yksityi-
sen järjestelmän alentamaan hintojaan. 
 
Avainsanat: maksujärjestelmät, verkostotaloustiede, sekaoligopolit 
 




Tiivistelmä (abstract in Finnish)..............................................................................4 
 
1 Introduction......................................................................................................7 
  1.1  High value cross-border payment systems in the euro area ......................7 
  1.2  Public ownership in network industries and mixed oligopolies................8 
 
2  Assumptions of the basic model....................................................................10 
 
3 Solving  the  model ...........................................................................................12 
  3.1  Profit maximising pricing of the private system .....................................12 
  3.2  Optimal pricing by central banks.............................................................14 
  3.3  Welfare maximising pricing of the private system..................................16 
 
4  Central banks as service providers of the private system..........................18 
  4.1  Fees to be paid by the private system......................................................18 


















1.1 High  value  cross-border  payment systems in the euro 
area 
The formation of a European single market highlights the importance of efficient 
cross-border payment systems. There are two competing yet complementary 
systems for high value cross-border payments. Central banks run their TARGET 
system. In this system, euro denominated payments are transferred between 
participating banks through Eurosystem central banks. A payment is made by 
debiting the central bank account of the payer and crediting the central bank 
account of the payee. It is possible to transfer payments to nearly all the major 
banks in the euro area. TARGET operates on real-time basis, and the execution of 
a payment takes place in a few minutes, or even seconds, whenever the system is 
open. It is a gross settlement system; each payment is processed separately, and 
no kind of netting of payments is used. (See BoF 2002, p. 246, for a more detailed 
description of the system). 
  The private Euro1 system is owned and managed by the Euro Banking 
Association. Payment orders are collected during the day, but payments are not 
executed continuously. The system is based on end-of-day netting with central 
bank money. The system has its own account with the ECB, and the net payment 
to be made or received by a participant is settled between this account and the 
account of each participant with the national central bank. Each participant either 
makes one payment to the system or receives one payment from the system at the 
end of the day, except if either there are no payments to be processed or if 
incoming and outgoing payments happen to exactly offset each other. Participants 
have credit and debit caps, and if these limits are violated, payments are not 
processed but put into an on-hold queue. The number of participants in this 
payment system is relatively limited, less than one hundred. In Finland, for 
instance, there were only three participants in January 2005. 
  TARGET and EURO1 are not perfect substitutes. TARGET is faster and 
presumably more reliable, but, on the other hand, it is more expensive to use. 
Despite of the limited number of participating banks, payments through EURO1 
outnumber payments through TARGET. There are certain differences between 
typical payments processed through the two systems. Payments through EURO1, 
are, on average, somewhat smaller and probably less urgent. (BoF 2004, p. 154) 
  Previous academic literature on payment systems has not had a particular 
focus on competition between interbank payment systems. However, there is 
some analysis on welfare implications of payment system design. Kahn and 
Roberds (2001) have presented a theoretical analysis on large value gross 
payment systems. Their model does also include the real economy in an explicit  
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way. The model implies that lack of intraday credit in a gross settlement system 
causes allocative distortions because agents’ transaction possibilities are affected 
by their inability to make payments. Allocative distortions are not completely 
avoided unless credit is available with no collateral. 
  The Eurosystem does not grant intraday liquidity to banks without adequate 
collateral. The liquidity cost of payment needs, however, is alleviated by the fact 
that banks are required to hold a certain amount of reserves on their central bank 
accounts anyway, and these balances can be used as payment mediums. Because 
the minimum reserve requirement applies to the average of daily balances, a bank 




1.2  Public ownership in network industries and mixed 
oligopolies 
Despite of recent privatisations, government owned companies exist in many 
industries in different parts of the world. Public ownership seems to be 
particularly commonplace in network industries, such as telecommunications, 
utilities, airlines and payment systems. This may not be a mere random 
coincidence. In industries without network effects the allocation of resources 
normally approaches Pareto optimality if competition is enhanced, making it 
difficult to argue in favour of government intervention beyond antitrust policies. 
In network industries, instead, the situation is more complicated, and mere 
antitrust policies may not lead to socially optimal outcomes. According to Shy 
(2001) significant economies of scale are one of the typical characteristics of 
network industries, and it used to be commonplace to let a government controlled 
company operate as a ‘natural monopoly’ in such industries. In addition to this 
example it is possible to mention other kinds of special characteristics of network 
industries that make it impossible to achieve Pareto optimality simply by 
enhancing competition. In the presence of network externalities the number of 
customers using the same product directly enters the utility function of each 
individual customer, but a normal consumer ignores this externality while making 
consumption decisions. 
  In many cases public and private companies co-exist in the same industry. 
The literature on mixed oligopolies has analysed oligopolistic competition 
between private and public enterprises and the use of public ownership as a tool of 
industrial policy. Even though public ownership is particularly commonplace in 
network industries, there seem to be no theoretical analyses on mixed oligopolies 
in industries characterised by direct network externalities. In this sense, the 
following sections contain pioneering work.  
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  The mixed oligopoly approach yields no interesting results unless it is 
assumed that a public firm is different from private companies. In their review 
article De Fraja and Delbono (1990) identify three special characteristics of 
publicly owned firms in previous literature. 
 
1.  The objective function may differ from private profit maximisers. 
2.  Cost efficiency may differ between public and private firms. 
3.  The public firm has been assumed to be either a Stackelberg leader or a 
Stackelberg follower. 
 
It has been particularly commonplace to assume that the objective function of the 
public firm differs from the profit maximisation objective of private firms. One of 
the earliest contributions in this literature even assumed that the publicly owned 
firm would try to maximise the total quantity of the commodity produced by the 
whole industry (Merrill & Schneider 1966). In later contributions the objective 
function typically includes elements of social welfare, and many authors (de Fraja 
and Delbono 1989, White 1996, Nishimori & Ogawa 2002) have simply assumed 
that it is simply the sum of consumer and producer surpluses. Some very sceptical 
considerations have been presented at least by Sappington and Sidak (2003). 
Because public firms do not maximise profits and they are not subject to takeover 
threats, they might pursue expansion in order to satisfy managers’ personal 
ambitions. This might lead to socially harmful practices, such as pricing below 
marginal costs and lobbying for restrictions that would hamper rivals’ operations. 
  It has often been assumed that the public firm suffers from an exogenously 
given cost inefficiency. In many settings this assumption is the only way to avoid 
the trivial solution that the best policy is to nationalise the whole industry. This 
assumption has been justified by the hypothesis that the managers of publicly 
owned firms may receive conflicting instructions because of conflicts of interest 
among politicians and civil servants, and because the government objectives may 
change after general elections. (Aharoni 1982) Matsumura and Matsushima 
(2004) have suggested that a profit maximising firm could have incentives to 
invest excessively in cost-reducing activities because of strategic motivations. 
However, not all the empirical research indicates that public ownership would be 
automatically related to weaker efficiency (See Willner 1994 and Willner 2001, 
p. 734–736). 
  The public firm could be either a Stackelberg leader or a Stackelberg 
follower. De Fraja and Delbono (1989) demonstrated that if the public firm 
maximises social welfare in normal Cournot competition with identical products, 
it produces an output where the price of the good equals its marginal cost. 
However, if the public firm is a Stackelberg leader, its price turns out to be higher 
than the marginal cost. This outcome has clear analogies with some findings of 
the model to be presented in the following.  
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2  Assumptions of the basic model 
The following model has to a large extent been inspired by the current situation in 
the euro area. There are two identical countries. Each country is inhabited by m 
bank customers. In each country there is a large number of competing banks. 
These banks have no market power. They may offer many kinds of financial 
services, but this paper analyses nothing but the provision of cross-border 
payments. 
  There are two cross-border payment systems. One of these systems is run by 
central banks trying to maximise welfare. The other one is jointly owned by all 
the banks in the two countries and it maximises the sum of profits made by the 
system itself and its shareholder banks. All the banks must be members of both 
systems. Both banks and payment systems use prices as decision variables. Prices 
cannot be negative. As in many previous contributions on mixed oligopolies, the 
public system is assumed to be the Stackelberg leader and to make its decisions 
first. 
  Each bank has an account with its national central bank. Banks’ own payment 
system has an account in the system of the central banks. Banks cannot 
intermediate customers’ cross-border payments without using either of the two 
payment systems. From the point of view of customers, the systems are not 
perfect substitutes. 
  Each bank has a large number of customers. The total number of customers in 
one country is m. Each bank is specialised in the sense that it has only one type of 
customers. The customers of a bank are completely identical, and all of them 
always have similar needs to initiate payments, and they always receive similar 
payments from abroad. The willingness to pay for the service varies between 
customers of different banks, but not between customers of the same bank. All the 
payments are of the same size. The sum of net utility to all the customers in both 
countries from using these payment services is 
 








c 2 p c 1 p n p n 2 / ) n n ( a n an n b n b ) n n ( b m 2 U − − + + − − − + =  (2.1) 
 
where a, b1 and b2 are exogenous parameters (a > 0, b1 > 0, b2 > 0, s > 0), np (nc) is 
the relative share of customers who make payments through the private (central 
bank) system; 0  ≤ np ≤ 1;  0 ≤ nc ≤  1. The fee for payments through the central 
bank system charged by banks is denoted pc, and the fee for sending payments 
through the private system is denoted pp. The expression in brackets in the 
formula (2.1) is the utility per customer, m the number of customers in one 
country and 2 the number of countries. Because payments through the two 
systems are likely to be substitutes but they cannot be complements, a  ≥ 0. 
However, if nc = np, the value of a does not directly affect the level of utility.  
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  Even though aggregate demand for payment services is known beforehand, it 
is not possible to say ex ante which bank has a clientele that actually makes 
payments, and which one is going to get payments. 
  One could argue that the utility function is unrealistic in the sense that in real 
life the payee does also benefit from the functioning of the payment system. On 
the other hand, whatever the transactions that create the need for payments are, it 
is always possible to adjust the terms of the transactions so that payees’ needs are 
fully reflected in the demand for services. For instance, if the costs of making 
cross-border payments are very high, it is possible that some importers stop 
buying foreign goods, but if these buyers are truly important customers for sellers, 
they would offer discounts in order to lower the total cost for foreign customers. 
  The central bank system is a real time gross settlement (RTGS) system not 
based on netting. The operational cost of the central bank system is 
2
c mcn 2.  
Hence, the marginal cost of transactions is increasing. Sending a payment through 
it causes a liquidity cost (α ≥  0) to the payer’s bank because there is no 
mechanism that would match incoming and outgoing payments. Both banks need 
to reserve the required liquidity. This cost is mainly due to the fact that the bank 
must hold a large balance on its account with the central bank, acquire eligible 
securities to be used as collateral in order to acquire intraday liquidity and 
possibly acquire non-collateralised short-term funding from expensive private 
sources. 
  The private system, instead, is based on netting. If the customers of a bank 
both send and receive payments, outgoing and incoming payments offset each 
other, and the bank neither makes nor receives payments when these payments are 
settled. If there are outgoing payments but no incoming payments, the bank has to 
pay the net amount to the account of the private system through the central bank 
system. If, instead, there is nothing but incoming payments, the bank receives the 
difference from the private system through the central bank system. The 
operational cost of the private system is 
2
p mcn 2 . Hence, the private and the public 
system are equally cost efficient, and the private system does also have increasing 
marginal costs. It would be possible to let the cost parameters differ between the 
public and the private system, which has been commonplace in previous models 
on mixed oligopolies, but this would make the analysis more complicated without 
major impact on results. 
  Both payment systems may also have some fixed costs; it might be unrealistic 
to assume that the systems have no other costs but the above mentioned increasing 
marginal cost. However, we can simply ignore these fixed costs because they do 
not affect optimal decisions. 
  Because of simplicity it is assumed that banks have no other costs than the 
fees charged by the two payment systems and the liquidity costs. 
  The sequential order is the following.  
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1)  Central banks decide the fee per transaction (βc) for using the central bank 
cross-border payment system. This decision is observed by all the agents. 
2)  The private system sets the fee (βp) for sending a payment through the private 
system. This fee is observed by all the agents. 
3)  Banks set their fees for cross-border payments. These fees are observed by all 
the agents. 
4)  Customers observe prices and their transaction needs. Customers initiate 
payments. 
 
No customer can initiate or receive more than one payment through the private 
system and another through the central bank system. It is not known ex ante who 
is going to get or initiate a cross-border payment, even though all the data to 
calculate the future magnitude of the flow of payments is observable after the 
stage 3. 
  Because the utility yielded by the use of a payments system depends above all 
on the use of the system itself rather than on the use of the competing system, and 
because in any interesting internal point solution the Pareto optimal use of both 
systems would be positive, it is assumed that the b parameters are large relative to 
other parameters of the model. To be more precise, the following limitations are 
imposed on parameter values; b2 > 3a/2; b1 > a; b2 > α+c; b2 > 2α; b1 > α+c. If 
these conditions are not satisfied, it is not possible to find a meaningful 
equilibrium where payment systems’ second order conditions are satisfied, the 
private system prefers to stay in the market and customers make positive amounts 
of payments through both systems. 
 
 
3 Solving  the  model 
3.1  Profit maximising pricing of the private system 
Customers maximise their utility (2.1) 
∂U/∂nc = 0 
∂U/∂np = 0 
 
] b ) a b ( 4 /[ )] p p b 2 ( a ) p b ( b 2 [ n
] b ) a b ( 4 /[ )] p p b 2 ( a ) p b ( b 2 [ n
2 2 p c 1 p 1 2 p
2 2 p c 1 c 1 2 c
− − − − − =
− − − − − = ⇒
 (3.1) 
 
Banks’ pricing of payments through the central bank system is straightforward. It 
is simply the fee charged by central banks plus the liquidity cost of the bank itself. 
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α + β = c c p  (3.2) 
 
Pricing of payments made through the private system is more complicated. 
Because of netting, it is possible that the bank does not have to incur the cost of 
liquidity. If payments can be netted, the bank does not have to incur the liquidity 
cost of making a payment to the account of the private system through the central 
bank system. The likelihood of customers not receiving a payment through the 
private system is simply  ) n 1 ( p −  and the expected value of the respective 
liquidity cost is  ) n 1 ( p − α . Because the number of customers of a bank is very 
large, the fee charged by the central bank for the final settlement in central bank 
money is negligible relative to the number of bank customers; the fee paid by a 
bank for the use of central bank money is now ignored. An analysis on this fee 
will be presented in the section 4.2. It follows that 
 
) n 1 ( p p p p − α + β =  (3.3) 
 
Combining (3.1) and (3.3) yields 
 
{ } [ ]
[] 2 2 2
c 1 2 p 2
2
p 2 2 1 2
p b ) b 2 ( 2 ) b 4 ( a
) b 2 b 4 ( b 4 a ) b 2 b 2 b ( b 2
p
− α − − α
β + − α + β + α − β + α + α −
=  (3.4) 
 
By combining (3.1), (3.2) and (3.4), the profit of the private system can be 
calculated to equal 
 
{}




1 p c p p 2 p 1 p p 2 2
p 1 2 p c 1
2
p p p
) b 4 ( a b ) b 2 ( 2
c ) b 2 ( ) c 2 ( b 4 a ) c ( c ) b ( b 2 b 2
) b ( b 2 a ) b 2 2 (
m 2
mcn 2 mn 2
α − − α −
− β + β + − β α − β − β − α + − β + β
β + − α − β + β + − α
=
= − β = Π
 (3.5) 
 
Because the owners of the private system are banks with no market power, they 
are unable to make any profits themselves. Therefore, the objective function of the 
private system reduces to its own profit. Park & Ahn (1999) have presented a 
detailed analysis on jointly owned upstream suppliers as a tool of collusion. The 
first order condition of profit maximisation (∂∏/∂βp = 0) yields
1 
 
                                                 
1 Second order condition ∂
2∏/∂βp
2 = -4m(2b2-a)[(2b2-a)(b2+c-α)+(2b2-3a)b2]/ 
[2b2(2b2-α)-a(4b2-α)]
2; This is negative because a ≤2b2/3 and b2 > 2α.  
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2 2 2 2
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+ α − − α − + β − α − − α −
= β  (3.6) 
 
This functional form has intuitive characteristics. The fee charged by the private 
system does not depend on the fee charged by the central bank system if the two 
systems are not substitutes (a = 0 ⇒ ∂βp/∂βc = 0). It is possible to demonstrate that 
if the systems are substitutes (a > 0), high fees charged by the central bank system 
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Because  0 ) c 2 ( a ) 2 c 4 b 4 )( a b ( 2 2 > α − + α − + −  even when a has its maximum 
value (a = 2b2/3) and because  0 /
2
p
2 < β ∂ π ∂ , it follows that in any meaningful 
case 0 / c p > β ∂ β ∂ , which is intuitive and a typical result in Bertrand competition. 
 
 
3.2  Optimal pricing by central banks 
When the central bank system sets its fee, it understands that the fee will affect the 
allocation of resources in the payment systems in two different ways, directly and 
through its impact on the fee charged by the private system. As implied by (3.6), 
the central bank system can affect the pricing of the private system. Because the 
fee charged by the private system exceeds the marginal cost, central banks have 
an incentive to try to affect the use of the private system, and the only available 
tool is the fee charged by central banks themselves. However, as will be seen, the 
optimal policy is not to charge low fees in order to force the private system to cut 
its own fees. 


































where  ψ is the sum of consumer surpluses and payment systems’ profits. 
Unsurprisingly, if the central bank system cannot affect the behaviour of the 
private system because a  =  0 the formula for βc implies marginal cost pricing 
) c b /( ) b ( c c n 2 2 1 c
*
c + α − = = β . Nevertheless, it is more interesting to analyse cases  
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where the two systems are substitutes (a  >  0). In principle, it is possible to 
calculate the closed form solution to the optimal value of the central bank fee. 
There is only one value of βc that satisfies the optimisation conditions. The result 
is presented in the mathematical appendix 1. This formula for βc is complicated, 
and probably not very condusive to our understanding of the optimal central bank 
pricing. However, the formula is of interest because it implies that βc has a unique 
real root. It is possible to analyse optimal central bank pricing without using this 
formula. 
 
Result; If a > 0, then a welfare maximising central bank system prices above 
the marginal cost. 
 
Proof If  βp is treated as a function of βc, the equation (3.8) can also be written 
as 
 


















































    By applying the formulas (3.6), (3.4) and (3.1), we can calculate that 
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    By applying the formulas (3.1), (3.2), (3.4) and (3.6) this can be rewritten 
as 
 
   [ ]
{} [] ) c b 4 ( a ) c b 2 ( b 2 ) a b 2 (
) 2 b 2 ( a ) a b ( b 2
) a b ( m 4
n 2 2 2 2
c 1 1 2
2
p α − + − α − + −






    Because in any meaningful case where customers prefer to use payment 
services of the central bank system pc = βc + α < b1, and because of the 
assumptions on parameter values, it follows that ∂ψ/∂np > 0.  Because 
dψ/∂np > 0 and because of (3.10) it follows that (∂ψ/∂np)(∂np/∂βc) > 0. 
 
    If the public system prices at marginal cost, then ∂ψ/∂nC = 0  because 
there is no network externality in the public system. It follows that the 
formula (3.9) cannot hold because the sum of a positive term and zero 
cannot equal zero. Therefore, the equation (3.9) holds with a value of βc  
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that is characterised by (∂ψ/∂nC)(∂nC/∂βc) < 0, which cannot be satisfied 
unless ∂ψ/∂nC > 0, which is the case when the central bank system prices 
above its marginal cost. 
   Q.E.D. 
 
The private profit maximising system does also charge a fee that is higher than the 
socially optimal fee, and by increasing its own fee the central bank system 
encourages the private system to increase its fee further. However, such a pricing 
policy can paradoxically improve social welfare. This odd result has the following 
explanation. Because the private system charges a fee that is higher than the 
socially optimal fee, customers do not use the private system as much as they 
should from the point of view of resource allocation (dψ/∂np > 0). Therefore, it is 
welfare improving to encourage customers to increase the use of the private 
system by making the public system more expensive. This would not eliminate 
monopoly pricing. In fact, it would make monopoly pricing worse, but its adverse 
consequences would be alleviated. The fee of the central bank system is probably 
relatively close to the marginal cost, implying that a decrease in the use of the 
system has a very weak marginal impact on the net welfare yielded by the public 
system. 
  This result has clear analogies with the old finding that subsidising a 
monopoly instead of taxing it can induce a Pareto improvement because the 
subsidy would encourage it to increase output. (See Guesnerie and Laffont 1978.) 
The analogies with the result of de Fraja and Delbono (1989) may be even clearer; 
in their model a welfare maximising Stackelberg leader in a Cournot oligopoly 
produces an amount that leads to an outcome where the price of the good is higher 
than the marginal cost; if the output were so large that the price were equal to the 
marginal cost its profit maximising rivals would produce much less than in the 
social optimum. As seen above, this finding is robust even if one assumes 
Bertrand competition. 
  The outcome of the model is mathematically complicated, but the values of 
βp, nc and np can be solved explicitly. (See mathematical appendix 2.) 
 
 
3.3  Welfare maximising pricing of the private system 
The profit maximising system prices according to (3.6), but socially optimal 
pricing can be analysed as a hypothetical case. The sum of surpluses (Ψ) equals 
the difference of consumer gross utility and the total costs of processing the 




] α + α − + + −













c 2 p c 1
n ) n 1 ( n c n c n
2 / ) n n ( a n an n b n b ) n n ( b m 2
 (3.11) 
 
When (3.1) is substituted for nc and np, (3.2) for pc, and (3.4) for pp, in the special 
case where the two systems are not substitutes (a = 0) the first order condition of 



















p  (3.12) 
 
Interestingly, the marginal cost for the private system differs from this socially 
optimal hypothetic fee. The marginal cost equals  ) c b /( ) b ( c cn 2 2 1 p + α − α − = , 
which is greater than 
*
p β  whenever α > 0. If the private system maximised social 
welfare, it would price below the marginal cost. If the liquidity cost effect is 
extreme (α ≥ 2c), the socially optimal fee to be charged by the private system 
would be 0. This result is due to the network externality of the liquidity cost 
effect. By sending payments through the private system the payer creates a 
positive externality that benefits the bank of the payee and its customers. 
Therefore, it is welfare maximising to encourage would-be customers to send 
payments through the private system. If there is no liquidity cost externality, this 
effect vanishes. 
  The result does also apply to cases where the two systems are substitutes 
(a > 0). When both systems have the same objective function, the sequential order 
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Because of 3.1, 3.2 and 3.4, it follows that 
 
                                                 






2; This is negative because a ≤ 2b2/3 and b2 > 2α. 
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If the liquidity cost effect exists (α > 0), it follows that βp – 2npc, is negative, and 
the marginal cost of the private system exceeds the optimal private fee. 
  Hence, a welfare maximising private system would price below the marginal 
cost even when a > 0. If the private system prices according to (3.13), the central 
bank system, instead, prices at the marginal cost (βc = 2ncc), which is intuitive in 
the absence of the liquidity related network externality. 
  The result (3.13) implies that the welfare maximising public enterprise has a 
very challenging task in an industry characterised by network externalities. If it 
wants to implement the first best outcome, it should induce its profit maximising 
rival to price below marginal cost, which would often be impossible, not least 
because of the participation constraint of the private undertaking. If the private 
system has either constant or declining marginal costs and possibly some fixed 
costs, it would be nearly impossible to implement the first-best outcome because 
in the optimum the private rival would make losses and prefer to exit. 
 
 
4  Central banks as service providers of the private 
system 
4.1  Fees to be paid by the private system 
The central bank system is not only a competitor of the private system. It is also 
an essential service provider. Until now, this issue has been ignored. The central 
bank system has the possibility to impose fees on both participating banks and the 
private payment system. Such fees would undoubtedly have an impact on the fees 
charged by the private agents. The impact of fees to be paid by the private system 
will be analysed in this section. 
 Let  βn denote the fee the private payment system has to pay for each payment 
it sends to a participating bank when payments through the private system are 
settled on net basis with central bank money. The total fee burden to the private 
payment system is 
 
p p n n ) n 1 ( m 2 − β  (4.1) 
 
And if the relative number of payments in the private system increases, the 
respective marginal cost is  
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n p) n 2 1 ( β −  (4.2) 
 
Interestingly, this is negative whenever np > ½. Hence, this central bank fee can 
paradoxically lower the private marginal cost of payments in the private system 
whenever the use of the private system is intense. The fee would certainly 
increase the average cost of the private system, but the marginal cost is more 
relevant to pricing and economic efficiency. Hence, it is reasonable to analyse 
whether there can be cases where the misallocation of resources caused by 
monopoly pricing of the private system can be avoided by imposing a special fee 
for using central bank money for settlement purposes. As seen in (3.13), Pareto 
optimality requires that the private system prices below its marginal cost. 
  The profit of the private system will be 
 
] ) n 1 ( n ) cn ( n [ m 2 n p p p p p β − − − β = Π  (4.3) 
 
When pp is determined by (3.4), pc by (3.2) and nc and np by (3.1), the first order 
condition of profit maximisation yields
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Now, it is essential to know whether the central bank system can create a situation 
where this profit maximising fee leads to the Pareto optimum. The Pareto optimal 
allocation of resources is characterised by 
 
                                                 
4 The second order condition is ∂
2∏/∂βp
2 = -4(2b2-a)[2b2(2b2+c-βn-α)-a(4b2+c-α-βn)]/ 
[2(2b2-α)-a(4b2-α)]
2; This is negative if βn < [(2b2-a)(2b2+c-α)-2b2a]/(2b2-a).  
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If nc and np are determined according to (3.1), pc according to (3.2), pp according 
to (3.4) and βp according to (4.4), it follows that the conditions (4.5) are satisfied 
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As the formula for βc implies, this first best solution is characterised by marginal 
cost pricing for payments through the central bank system. The first best solution 
must be characterised by below marginal cost pricing by the private system, as 
implied by (3.12) and (3.13). 
  It is rather reasonable to believe that the central bank system does not 
subsidise the private system for sending payments through the central bank 
system. Therefore, meaningful cases are characterised by βn > 0.  The  formula 
(4.6) for the fee βn implies positive values if 
 
)] a c b ( 2 [







α + + + +
>  (4.7) 
 
This result is easy to understand intuitively; if the parameter b1 has a relatively 
high value, it is likely that the number of payments will be large enough for the 
paradoxical situation that an additional fee by the central bank lowers the 
marginal cost of the private system and induces it to decrease its price. (See 4.2) 
  The optimal combination of fees (4.6) cannot be used to implement the first 
best outcome unless a number of criteria are satisfied. For instance, the formula 
(4.4) must lead to be the maximum of profits, not the maximum of losses or the 
minimum of profits. The combination of payment volumes characterised by (4.5) 
must be the maximum of social welfare, not the minimum. It is far from obvious 
that cases satisfying all the necessary criteria do exist, and many of the second 
order conditions are too complicated to be analysed. The criteria are listed and  
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described in the mathematical appendix 3. However, it is easy to prove with 




4.2  An irrelevance result 
In the section 4.1 it was demonstrated that whenever more than half of the would-
be payers actually send payments through the private system, a fee for using 
central bank money for the net settlement of these payments will paradoxically 
induce the private system to cut its own fee. It was assumed that these fees are 
paid by the private system. However, the central bank can also impose fees on 
participating banks. If a participating bank has to pay a fee (βb) to the central bank 
system, its profit from intermediation of payments through the private system will 
be 
 
0 ) )( n 1 ( p b p p p = β + α − − β −  (4.8) 
 
By applying the formulas (3.1), (3.2) and (4.8), we can calculate that the 
competitive equilibrium price for payments through the private system will be 
 
) b 4 ( a ) b 2 ( b 2
)} b 2 b 4 ( ) ( b 4 b 2 { a
} b ) b b 2 ( ) ( b 2 { b 2
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b 2 b 2 2
c 1 b 2 b p 2 c b b 1
2
b 1 1 2 p b 2 2
p β − α − − β − α −
β + − β + α + β + β + β β + β − α −
β − − α − β + β
=  (4.9) 
 
When the private system optimises, it sets its fee according to the condition 
 
                                                 
5 For instance, if b1 = 2.1, b2 = 1, a = 0.1, c = 0.1 and α = 0.05, it follows that np = np
* ≈ 0.978, 
nc = nc
* ≈ 0.930, βc ≈ 0.673, βp ≈ 0.147 and βn ≈ 1.937; All the second order conditions are 
satisfied in this point ∂
2∏/∂βc
2 ≈ -0.009m < 0; ∂
2Ψ/∂nc
2 ≈ -4.2m < 0; ∂
2Ψ/∂np
2 ≈ -4.00m < 0; The 
private system will make a positive profit; ∏ ≈ 0.014m > 0.  
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Therefore, whenever the central bank system increases the fee to be paid by a 
bank sending payments to the private system by one cent and decreases the fee to 
be paid by the private system by one cent, the net impact of this on the fee paid by 
the end customer is zero. Thus, from the point of view of allocational efficiency, 
fees paid by payers’ banks and fees paid by the private system are perfect 
substitutes in central bank decision making. Nothing but the sum of βn and βb 
matters to allocational efficiency, and all the combinations of these two fees 
leading to the desired total fee level βn + βb are equally optimal. 
  On surface, this result may seem surprising, but the intuition is extremely 
simple. The fee burden on the payment flows is the same irrespective of whether 
the fees are paid by the payer bank or the payment system. The total fee burden is 
2m(βn + βb)np(1 – np), and any given fee burden can be implemented with an 
extremely large number of combinations of βn and βb. Because banks make no 
profits anyway, there cannot be distributional effects between the private system 
and participating banks. In principle, there might be distributional effects between 






This paper presents a model on a mixed duopoly of cross-border payment 
systems. There is a central bank gross payment system and a private system based 
on netting of payments. The private system needs central banks for settling 
payments on net basis with central bank money. The difference between gross and 
net payment systems is of importance because a gross payment system ties up 
more liquidity, which causes costs to participating banks. The central bank system 
differs from the private system not only because it is a gross payment system; 
moreover, it is a Stackelberg leader and it maximises social utility whereas the 
private system maximises profits. 
  One of the main findings is that if the only type of fee the central bank is able 
to charge is the fee paid by banks that intermediate customers’ payments to be 
settled in the central bank system, it is welfare maximising to charge a fee that 
exceeds the marginal cost. This result is due to the fact that the profit maximising 
private system uses its market power and charges fees higher than the marginal 
cost, leading to sub-optimal use of the private system. Therefore, it is optimal for 
the central bank to encourage the use of the substituting private system. This 
result has some analogies with the classical finding that it may be socially optimal 
to subsidise a monopoly in order to encourage it to increase output (Guesnerie and 
Laffont 1978). Analogies with the result of de Fraja and Delbono (1989) are even 
clearer: in Cournot competition a Stackelberg leader public firm sells its products 
at a price higher than the marginal cost because this increases the use of the 
privately produced good. 
  Paradoxically, it is possible to construct examples where the central bank 
system should charge a fee to be paid either by the private system or the 
participating banks for the use of central bank money in the private net settlement 
system. Surprisingly, in these cases the fee to be paid by the end customer is 
lower than what it would be if the central bank system offered settlement services 
for free. These cases are characterised by a relatively large amount of payments 
through the private system, implying that netting can be used at a wide scale, and 
the fee charged by the central bank does not have to be paid very often. The 
central bank fee, however, can affect the profit maximising fee of the private 
system, and the latter effect may dominate. The result would probably not hold 
with a substantially different demand for payment services. If, for instance, the 
demand for payment services is very skewed during a day, and there is a strong 
yet price elastic demand for payments from country A to country B but hardly any 
demand for payments in the opposite direction, it is probably very difficult to 
construct examples where a high fee for using central bank money for net 
settlement purposes would decrease the marginal cost of the private system.   
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  This model includes an explicit network externality; by sending payments 
through the private system a payer helps the bank of the payee to save on liquidity 
costs. In real life, another kind of network effect is probably rather relevant at 
least to the Euro1 system. In the above model, it was assumed that all the banks 
are automatically members in both systems, which is not true in the case of Euro1. 
Because not all the banks in the Euro area participate in the system, the positive 
network externality on participating banks should be taken into account when one 
evaluates the social benefits of the decision of a new member to join the system.  
  The central bank could not implement the first best solution if the private 
system had constant or declining marginal costs. Because in the optimum the fee 
charged by the private system is lower than its marginal cost, the marginal cost 
must be higher than the average cost; otherwise the private system would not 
voluntarily enter. It may not be necessary that the marginal cost curve of the 
private system is monotonically increasing. It should be enough if the marginal 
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The welfare maximising value of βc, when there are no fees for the use of central 
bank money in the net settlement of payments of the private system, equals 
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This is negative if the numerator is. Where c = 0, the numerator equals  
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When the numerator is differentiated with respect to c, one gets 
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implying that the numerator is even more negative when c > 0.  0 d / d
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When  βc is optimised according to the appendix 1, and the private system 
maximises its profit according to (3.6), it follows that 
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And the respective amounts of transactions in the two systems equal 
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Necessary conditions for the existence of a meaningful equilibrium 
 
1) Private system second order condition 
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2) Non-negativity of the private fee 
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when βn and βc are determined by (4.6), this can be rewritten as 
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3) Non-negativity of the private profit  
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When the indirect effect through βp is taken into account, this can be rewritten 
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6) Non-negativity of central bank fee βn 
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7) Non-negativity of central bank fee 
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8) Meaningful value of nc 
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9) Meaningful value of np 
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